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This paper analyzes the possibility that reriff reductions in the presence of foreign capital may be 
immiserizing. Other impacts of tariff revisions in a Latin America-like context are also discussed. 
1. Introduction 
It is now fully appreciated that foreign capital inflow may be immiserizing 
in the presence of a distortionary tariff, as noted by Bhagwati (1973), Uzawa 
(1969), Hamada (1974), Minabe (1974) and most elegantly and definitively by 
Brecher and Alejandro (1977). 
The concerns of Latin American policymakers with the implications of 
trade liberaltition in the presence of private foreign investment suggest he 
obverse and novel analytical possibility: that tariff reduction, in the presence 
of foreign capital, may be immiserizing. 
This paper is addressed to analyzing this immiserization possibility, as also 
f;~ore ge,-rerally the welfare impact of tariff change, in the context of the 
traditional 2 x 2 model of trade theory. Section 2 develops briefly one case of 
immiserization in such a model, sufficing to prove the possibility of such 
immiserization. Section 3 then systematically traces the effects of 
continuously varying tariffs and trade subsidies, from autarky to complete 
S ialization, on overall welfare change, gross and net ct the ‘redistribution 
*The credit for noting the fact that foreign capital raises difficulties for trade hberalization 
klongs fully to Brnesto Tironi whose MIT dissertation (1976a) discussed this in relation to the 
Andean Common Market, using partial-equilibrium analytical tools. Also see Tironi (1976b, 
1977). Thanks are due to the National Science Foundation, Grant No. SOC77-07188 and the 
Program of Research on the International Economic Order of the Ford Foundation for support 
of the research underlying this paper. We are grateful to Richard Brecher and T.N. Srinivasan 
for many helpful comments. 
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effect’, under specified assumptions concerning the domestic and foreign 
ownership of primary factors of production, the distribution of tariff proceeds 
and the incidence of taxes to pay the trade subsidy (if the tariff is a subsidy), 
and the factor-intensity of traded goods. Section 4 extends the analysis 
briefly to tariff changes in the context of customs unions. 
2. Immiserization: An example 
Take two primary factors, K (capital) and L (labour) in fixed supply, and 
two traded goods, X and I: Let all capital be foreign-owned. Assume the 
country is small in the Samuelson sense, i.e., the terms of trade are fixed. Let 
Y be the importable good and assume it to be L-intensive while good X is 
K-intensive. To avoid tariff-revenue problems, we will compare free trade 
with autarky. 
Then starting from autarky, the move to free trade should unambiguously 
improve welfare if all factors were domestic. However, the decline in the 
relative price of the importable good x which is L-intensive, will lead (as per 
the well-known Stolper-Samuelson argument) to a decline in the real wage 
of labour and a rise in the real rectal of capital. Since labour is in fixed 
supply, it is clear that it is unambiguously hurt and, since all capital is 
foreign-owned, this is tamamount to net welfare for the country having 
declined. 
3. Welfare effects of coetinuous tariff variation in the presence of foreign 
capital 
The preceding analysis is sufficient to establish how trade liberalization in 
the presence of foreign capital may yield immiseration. However, a complete 
categoriz*ation of the effect of continuous tariff variation on net welfare of a 
country with foreign capital can be made, as in the rest of this paper. 
We will stmplify our analysis in two critical respects, throughout this 
paper First, we will assume that the country has no monopoly power in 
trade, i.e., its external terms of trade are fixed. Second, all labour is domestic 
and I ?I capital is foreign. The latter assumption enables us to carry over 
here, without sermus modification, the existing theoretical analysis of the 
impact of tariff change on the domestic rewards of different factors of 
production, as initiated by the celebrated Stolper-Samuelson analysis. 
Note initially that the variation of the tariff from the prohibitive to the 
zerc9 level, in the 2 x 2 model, will raise now the problem of deciding on the 
allocation of the tariff revenue between domestic and foreign factors of 
production. Equally, if we permit the tariff variation to negativ: values and 
thus to include trade subsidies, we will need to decide on the allocation of 
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the tax burden to pay these subsidies. Since the welfare implications depend 
critically on the assumptions made in these two respects, as also on whether 
the importable good is capital-intensive or labour-intensive, a taxonomic 
mapping of the welfare implications must be undertaken. 
We need to distinguish between two primary possibilities determined by 
whether the importable is capital-intensive (Case 1) :..r labour-intensive (Case 
11). In regard to tariff revenues+ it makes little economic sense to consider the 
case where they are distributed to foreign capital. Therefore, all cases will 
assume that tariff revenue accrues to domestic factors through lump-sum c 
redistribution B la Meade’s analysis (1950). However, since we extend the 
analysis to trade subsidies, and taxes to pay the trade subsidies can well fall 
on foreign capital, we will explicitly consider this possibility as also the 
possibility that the incidence of such taxation is wholly on domestic labour. 
Moreover, we will assume that there is no repatriation of earnings of foreign 
capital, all such earnings being spent in the host country itself. 
3.1. WelJzre change as tar@ varies, with no foreign capita! 
First, let us recall the welfare impact of continuous tariff variation in this 
small country on the assumption that all factors are domestically owned. We 
will then be able to contrast these results with the impiications of the 
presence of foreign capital that we derive in the rest of this paper. 
Denote overall, ‘gross’ welfare, as $ all capital were domestic, by the 
ordinal index UG and the national welfare (i.e., welfare of the domestic 
factors alone), by UN, the standard assumptions being made in each case to 
make the implied social utility function valid.’ 
Then, for a small country, in fig. 1, with producJion possibility curve QS 
and world prices fixed at EF, autarky production and consumption are at .4 
and free trade production and consumption are at F and E respectively. The 
corresponding utility levels show that UC(A)< UG(F), since free trade is 
superior to autarky.* 
Now, it is known tllat,3 ruling out inferior goods (which we do, 
throughout here), continuous tariff variation leading from F to A in fig. 1 
will yield a monotonically decreasing UG. Any furlher shift beyond n 
towards Q however is impossible with only a tariff since any further increase 
rn the prohibitive tariff at A would only be redundant.” On the other hand, 
‘The distinction between UG 2nd UN in utility terms corresponds to the distinction between 
GDP and GNP in terms of income. 
“Strictly speaking, tP(A)~Uo(F) since A may coincide with F; and UC(F) is also the 
maximal utility obtainable under the assumptions made, 
‘Cf Bhagwati (1968) and Kemp (1968). For the large-country tariff ranking by welfare impact, 
see Bhagwati and Kemp (1969). 
‘However as Richard Ilrecher has pointed out to us, the simultnneous e beyond A of an 
export subsiby for good Y wonld make a move to Q feasible. This PossibiliPj is ignored below. 
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it is possible with a trade subsidy to move from F to S and the continuous 
increase in the trade subsidy until it leads to complete specialization at S will 
yield a monotonically declining social utility. The total plot of UC, as the 
GOOD X (EXPORTABLE) 
Fig. 1 
tariff is therefore varied from the prohibitive level at A to the negative value 
that brings specialization at S, is then in fig. 2. Since UG(S)$UG(A), the lelt- 
hand side subsidy quadrant shows these three alternative possibilities;” on 
the other hand, UG(F)> UG(A) and UG(F)> UG(S).‘j 
3.2. Case I: Importable cup&&intensive, tariff revenue accruing only to 
domestic factors, papita wholly foreign 
Consider now the effect on national wcltare (UN), accruing only to 
domestic factors, for the same range of tariff viuiation, when (homogeneous) 
capital is wholly foreign-owned and tariff revenue goes only to domestic 
factors. We consider here the case where the importable is capital-intensive. 
Consid P first the variation in the tariff from A to F, from autarky to free 
trade. As the domestic relative price of the importable falls, so does the real 
rental of capital a la Stolper-Samuelson. With no tariff revenue assumed to 
be going to foreign capital, foreign capital therefore unambiguouety and 
5UG(S’)=UG(A), UG(S2)>UG(A), and UG(S3)<UG(A). 
6Again, strictly speaking, UC(F) L @(A) as A and F mi.y coincide, and UG(F) > UG(S) as F 
and S may coincide, although figs- 1 and 2 are drawn to exclude the equality signs and our 
arguments in the text consistently exclude them. 
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continuously loses. On the other hand, the fact that UC would 
unambiguously increase as the tariR is reduced for this small country means 






(labout) by assumption, the real income of labour in terms of either good 
must increase with successive tariff reductions.’ It follows of course that 
national we!fare would correspondingly improve since it must reflect labour’s 
welfare in our model. The plot of the changes in UN, as the tariff is varied 
from the autarkic level to zero, is therefore monotonically welfare-improving 
for UN (as it was for UG), as seen in the right-hand side quadran’ of fig. 3. 
As the tar8 goes from zero to negative values with a trade subsidy, the 
‘redistribution effect’ A la Stolper-Samuelson real wage argument continues 
to operate against capital. However, the tariff revenue is now replaced by the 
trade subsidy which must be paid for by lump-sum taxation on the factors. If 
the incidence of the taxation is on domestic factors as we!& then the fact that 
UG is declining from F to S (instead of rising,, as from A to F) will imply that 
the improved real wage of domestic labour may weil be accompnied by a 
decline in its real income (i.e., wage net of taxes) and hence by reduced u”. 
Thus, in principli:, trade subsidy variation in the presence of foreign capital 
may result. in specialization with a range of welfare outcomes regarding the 
‘For a similar argument in the context of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, see Bhagwati 
(1959). This paper introduced for the first time the distinction, relevant here, between real wage 
and real income, the latter defined as real wage plus redistributed tariff revenue. f’or a brilliant 
subsequent analysis of the extension of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem on real wages to real 
incomes, see Rao (1971). 
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free trade and the autarkic levels of national welftire: UN(S)~UUN(E) and 
UN(S)sUN(A’), as illustrated in fig. 3.8 Moreover, unlike the the right-hand 
side quadrant, there will be lack of monotonicity in the left-hand side 
quadrant in fig. 3. 
Fig. 3 
3.3. Case II: Importable labour-intensive, tarif revenue accruing only to 
domestic factors, capital whdly foreign 
For the alternative case where the importable good is labour-intensive, the 
redistribution ofearned income is now in favour of capital. 
As the economy moves from autatky to free trade, the falling price of the 
importable will then imply a falling t-eat v’age of labour and a rising real 
rental of capital. We have already noted, in section 1, that @‘(A)> V”‘(F) 
because the real wage of labour, which alone constitutes domestic factors, is 
lower under free trade than under autarky. However, for tariff rates in the 
interval of .4 and F, tariff revenue arises and will be redistributed todomestic 
factors, i.e. r:o labour. Therefore, there could be welfare-improving tariff- 
reduction, Ytween A and F and the decline of UN from UN(A) to UN(F) 
need not bc monotonic: as indicated by the two alternative schedules drawn 
in the right-hand side quadrant; of fig. 4. 
If we extend the argument now tc trade subsidies, increasing trade subsidy 
from free trade (F) to complete specialization (S) will keep increasing the real 
ital ind lowering t,he real wage of labour. However, if part of all 
of the incidence of taxation to pay the subsidy falls on labour, its real income 
Bin fig. 3, UN(S4)=UN(At, UN(Sz)=UNIF). 0N(S8)>U”(F), UN(Ss)-cU”(A) and UN(S’) 
> U”b4 1. UN(F)> UN(A), always. 
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will collapse even more. Therefore, assuming that the subsidy payments rise 
monotonically with the rate of trade subsidy, UN(F) will decline 
monotonically to U”(S) with increasing trade subsidy rate, as illustrated in 
the left-hand side quadr: G 
> UN(S), as drawn in fig. 4. 
of fig. 4. It follows moreover that UN(A)> UN(F) 
UN 
Fig. 4 
3.4. Summary of werfare rankings of zero tariff, prohibitive tar@ and trade 
subsidy Gust) producing complete specializatio,t 
The results of welfare rankings, by UG and UN, for the tariff rate producing 
autarky, for free trade with zero tariff, and for the trade subsidy just 
proc elcing complete specialization on the exportable good, can then be 
summarized, as in table 1. Evidently, the presence of foreign capital affects 
the welfare impact of tariff variation critically. 
3.5. Illustrating with the Johnson technique 
The results derived above can be readily illustrated with the aid of the 
general-equilibrium diagrammatic technique introduced by Johnson (1959, 
1960) io deal with income distribution in the 2 x 2 model. This technique, as 
adapted from Tironi (1976b), brings out well the role of the Stolpsr-’ 
Samuelson theorem in determining the behaviour of real wages, while also 
permitting the reader to see clearly the role that tariff revenue (or subsidy 
payment) plays in determining the impact on real income (i.e., earned wages 
plus redistributed tariff revenue or minus lumlJ-sum taxation to pay the trade 
to a non-zero ~~~-~~~~~~~~i~~ !c el however raise U” 
revenue in the new ~itu~t~~~~ when to domestre 
l&our share in 
int on QS, by drawing a line paralkl to the 
to that ~~~u~ti~n the intmxxtion 
point with the QLSL locus. Thus, for ex b, cmmponding to autarkic 
production at A, labour’s budget Line is A”, for production at F, it is 
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F’NF”, and for production at S, it is S’S,. Moreover, given the real wage 
behaviour a la Stolper-Samuelson, it is clear that A’MA” lies uniformly 
outside F’NF” and the latter in turn uniformly outside S’SL. 
0 SL F S A' 
GOOD X (CAPITAL-INTENSIVE 1 
Fig. 5 
0 SL T” A” R” 
GOOD X 
Fig. 6 
It is then ev[dent hat, when the economy shifts from autarky at A to free 
trade at F, the relehrant budget line for labour shifts from A'iJA" to FAT”. 
With all capital foreign-owned, it follows therefore that the shift to free trade 
will result in immiserization: UN(F), tangent to F’NF”, will be less than 
@‘(A), tangent to A’MA”. 
Consider next fig. 6 where we have shifted to comparison of the autarkic 
equilibrium with a non-prohibitive tariff which must be characterised by 
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tariff revenue. We eliminate QS from fig. 6, while indicating production 
equilibria at A and T for autarky and non-prohibitive tariff and concentrate 
on Q&,. For the autarkic equilibrium, labour’s budget line -.relevant for UN 
. - will remain A’MA”, as in fig. 5. But, for the non-prohibitive tariff 
equilibrium, the real-wage-determined bu get line T’M’T” (at barilfinclusiw 
price-ratio) must be augmented by redistributed tariff revenue which could 
take it, if tariff revenue were T”R”, to the real-incclmdetermined budget line 
R’R”. The result would be to make UN(T)> UN(A). The real-wage ff’ect 
works to worsen UN as the economy shifts from autarky but the tariff- 
revenue-distribution effect works to improve UN, and the net eff’t in the 
case illustrated in fig. 6 is to improve UN, i.e., UN(T)> UN(A). 
4. Customs unions in the presence of foreign capital 
Since the difficulties raised by the presence of foreign capital were 
originally considered in the context of regional trade iiberalization in the 
format of common markets and free trade areas, it would be relevant o 
show that our analysis can be readily applied to tariff change in the context 
of customs union. Thus, consider Viner’s trade creating and trade diverting 
customs unions, in turn. We will consider only the ‘basic’ Viner-Lipsey 
models where offer curves from the partner and the non-union countries are 
perfectly elastic and only two goods are produced, consumed and traded. 
4.1. 7’kade mating union 
If we con&de; the ‘pure’ trade creating customs union in the well-kncpwn 
Lipsey (1957) model where the home country is essentially reducing its fully- 
protected importable production in favour of imports from the partner 
country, and the non-union country is therefore not in the picture at all, the 
model reduces basically to our 2 x 2 model and the necessary comparison is
between UN(A), prior to the union, and UN(F), subsequent to the union.9 
Therefore, our analysis in section 3 applies fishy to the analysis of a trade 
zreating union: table 1 comparisons of UN(F) and UN(A) for Cases I and II 
are fully applicable. Evidently therefore, in Case II, a trade creating customs 
union can bc immerserizing in the presence of foreign capital. 
4.2. Trade diverting union 
Where, howel:er, the customs union diverts imports from the non-union to 
the partner country - Viner’s trade diverting union - we may consider two 
‘The free trade position, however, is with the partner country, not with the world at large. 
Overall free trade, F*, would lead to V(F*), which is not relevant here. 
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sub-cases: (i) where, as in Idpsey’s (195’7) classic paper on how the 
consumption gain can offset the terms of trade loss to make such a trade 
diverting union beneficial, we assume domestic production to be always 
specialized on the exportable; and (ii) where we allow home production to 
change with the union. 
(i) In the former case, there is clearly no redistributive ffect in production 
from the union as the importable price domestically falls within the union. 
However, the tariff revenue is lost as imports are switched from the non- 
union country before the union to the partner country after the union. If the 
tariff revenue was entirely redistributed to domestic labour, and capital is 
wholly foreign, we then can get a redistributive effect against domestic 
factors. Thus, even a ‘large’ consumption gain and ‘small’ terms of trade loss 
may be compatible with welfare loss (i.e., lower UN) if this ‘redistributive 
effect from the tariff revenue is large enough in a pure trade diverting union. 
And., if we were to assume that some or all revenue goes to foreign factors - 
an unrealistic assumption, not made in section 3 - then clearly a trade 
diverting anion, with no substitution in consumption and hence no 
consumption gain, may still result in improved UN because of the 
‘redistributive’ effect related to the tariff revenue. 
Fig. 7 illustrates the case where such improvement in UN takes place in a 
pure trade diverting union with zero consumption gain. Assume there that 
consumption takes place in the fixed proportion along the ray OS1C2C3. Let 
GOOD X 
Fig. 7 
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Q be the endowment of ylgsods, with these being divided 
capital and domestic labour m the ratio QQJQ& Prior 
union, trade takes place fro% Q to C3 at XlOtbUdOll WUW~ fOlFeif&tl prh3- 
ratio QM and domestic price-ratio is RS. The tariff revenue rated is NS 
and is redistributed to foreign capital. The tariff&venue-inchrsive ncome of 
foreign capital is therefore Q&Q& of earnings plus QR of revenue) whereas 
the income of labour is QLO. With consumption of each factor group lying 
along the same ray dCrCzCJ, the pre-union consumption point for labour is 
CI on its budget line QJL whereas the difference between C, and Cr 
constitutes the bundle consumed by foreign capital. The union then 
eliminates trade with the outside country and diverts it to the partner 
country at its price-line Q,$. Since Q& is steeper than QM, the country 3 
terms of trade have deteriorated. However, the Loss and more is absorbed by 
foreign capital; and domestic labour improves its welfare because its new 
budget line is Q& and therefore, the shift from CI to C2 implies a 
corresponding improuement i  UN, i.e., national welfare. The trade diverting 
union has clearly been beneficial, therefore, even though there is no 
consumption gain (nor production gain, i.e., decline in domestic production 
of protected importable in favour of imports from the partner country, or 
Viner’s Yrade creation’ in production): an outcome attributable solely to the 
assumption made regarding the distribution of tariff revenue to foreign 
capital alone. 
(ii) In the case where production will also vary, the trade diverting unitin 
will also involve changes in irx3rne distribution i la Stolper-Samuelson with 
the production change and tile net welfare impact of the union will be 
correspondingly complicated, exactly as in section 3. The details of this Case 
can be left for the interested reader to work out, in the manner set out in 
section 3. 
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